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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 June 1993 at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Hou Zhitong (China)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I declare open the 651st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the beginning I welcome warmly on behalf of the Conference and myself the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, His Excellency Mr. Kooijmans, who will be our first speaker today. The Minister is a well-known jurist with wide academic experience in the field of international law and he is the author of many publications dealing with important legal issues. He is also well known to the United Nations system, having chaired the Commission on Human Rights, which he regularly attends as head of the Netherlands delegation. Between 1973 and 1977 he served as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, having previously been Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Disarmament and International Security in Peace Problems. I am very happy to receive him today in our midst. We are also very pleased to welcome the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Petrovsky.

I have on my list of speakers for today His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the representatives of Turkey, Sweden and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I am very happy to give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, His Excellency Mr. Kooijmans.

Mr. KOOIJMANS (Netherlands): Thank you, Mr. President for your kind, introductory words. It is a pleasure for me to speak today under your presidency. You represent a State with which the Netherlands has long-standing relations. Only recently I had the pleasure of conducting extensive and fruitful discussions with the deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Qian Qichen, on the occasion of his visit to The Hague. I am confident that your presidency will be successful.

May I also take this opportunity to thank the representative of Canada for the excellent manner in which he conducted the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during his tenure. Finally, I would like to pay tribute to the professionalism and steadfastness of the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, concurrently special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General.

With the end of the cold war, the risk of a nuclear exchange between East and West has diminished dramatically, thus resulting in a substantial improvement of international security. Nonetheless, three years later the picture is, frankly, not a rosy one. Crisis stability has not increased correspondingly. War is once more a reality in a part of Europe. Hardly a day passes without us seeing evidence that chaos and destruction have come upon us again. If in the past, when cold-war tensions did act as a restraining force, we were content to sit back, we now realize that nationalism, regional strife and instability have resurfaced. Such developments leave us no room for complacency.

At the same time we should not give in to pessimism. There is still reason to have confidence in international cooperation if we all engage in a search for ways and means to respond creatively and effectively to new challenges. We must not permit ourselves to regress into virulent nationalism and ethnic strife, or, to use an expression once heard, "to become one-dimensional man again". International cooperation and integration has

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achieved so much that it would be inconceivable to risk all that for some ephemeral, narrow political gain.

It is vital for the Conference on Disarmament to realize that, despite some leftovers from the cold war, the outlook for the 1990s in terms of progress in arms control and disarmament is more promising than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Notwithstanding differences of opinion between members of this body on tactics, there is quite a degree of consensus on the broader strategy for achieving international peace and stability. Cooperative security efforts, if properly conceived, do stand a chance of success.

In my statement today, I wish briefly to review the broad parameters of the post-cold-war security agenda. Then I shall examine the approach required to meet the security needs of the 1990s. Finally, I would like to explore ways in which the Conference on Disarmament could fulfil its responsibilities vis-à-vis the international community.

What are the main characteristics of our present-day security environment?

First, cold-war tensions are no longer with us. Today's risks emanate from regional instability, overspilling ethnic and religious strife, and revived nationalist sentiments. The threats to international peace and security posed by non-military sources of instability were clearly recognized by the Security Council in its summit declaration of 31 January 1992. Evidently, the perception of insecurity has changed, together with the changing nature of the threats themselves. We have become aware that, in endeavouring to resolve political and military questions, the growing interrelation of economic, social and environmental issues cannot be ignored. The plight of the Kurds in Iraq and the acute humanitarian emergency in Somalia are cases in point. We realize what we are up against when we listen to some of the new vocabulary: the term "ethnic cleansing" can be heard frequently nowadays. It is very redolent of the worst excesses of racism which this century has witnessed. This is a most distressing development.

Secondly, the risk of regional or local conflicts degenerating into real threats to international security is exacerbated not only by the accumulated amounts of readily available conventional weapons all over the globe, but also by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery system. While irrevocable changes affecting relations between States in the post-cold-war era create opportunities for cooperative security in many areas of the world, old antagonisms have re-emerged and have become more dangerous. Let us by no means underestimate the dangers and convulsions which manifestly attend this process.

Finally, there is the new phenomenon which the Secretary-General of the United Nations has defined as "the failed State", meaning an entire State that collapses or risks collapsing after the withdrawal of its super-Power support. Here again new approaches, innovative and at times painful, must be developed.

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The focus of our attention is changing accordingly. In the past we had to prevent the one big outburst of premeditated fire that threatened to engulf us all. But now we must cope with the danger posed by many smaller fires in various areas in the world. These fires are certainly smaller, but they are still hot, and they may spread. If we are to do something meaningful, we should set ourselves clear goals. If we are to achieve international stability, then we must define the meaning of stability.

In the view of the Netherlands, freedom and stability go hand in hand. Long-term stability is only conceivable in an environment defined by democratic political systems, free-market economies, social justice, respect for human rights, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Dealing with regional conflicts is next to impossible if one does not tackle head-on the underlying causes of conflict. In the long run, no State can afford to isolate itself completely from events taking place in other parts of the world. Brutal aggression, repression, "ethnic cleansing", whether they occur in Cambodia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa or anywhere else, inevitably affect us all, if only because they undermine stability. Stability is essential to security. And without security, there will be no rule of law and no sustained economic development.

In the Charter of the United Nations we have at our disposal an instrument that is flexible enough to be adapted to new conditions. However, it should be kept in mind that the Charter was established under an international order which was dramatically different from the one we witness today. It is to the lasting credit of the politicians of the 1940s that they drafted a document that is as valid and applicable today as it was then.

I welcome the fact that the General Assembly, for its part, has embarked on a process of reflection as regards the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery. The Secretary-General's "New Dimensions" report was a timely initiative, as was the resumed session of the First Committee earlier this year. I hope that efforts to further rationalize the work of the Committee will continue, building, inter alia, on the proposal by the member States of the European Community to streamline the agenda of the First Committee.

Our primary duty remains the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable international peace and security. Granted, insecurity today is rather different from what was meant in the past. We must cope with many unforeseen situations at the same time, like a chess-player in a multiple chess match. To cling to old ideas amounts to making oneself irrelevant.

The Security Council of the United Nations was long prevented from fulfilling its proper role in ensuring international peace and security. Fortunately, it has now taken the lead in managing the transition to a new international security order. This becomes abundantly clear from the way the Security Council deals, inter alia, with conflicts in Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. It is up to us, States Members of the United Nations, to increasingly engage in creative thinking aimed at using as

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efficiently as possible the mechanisms available for the management of international peace and security. Solving the underlying causes of regional conflicts is, however, a major undertaking that will require a lot of time.

At the request of the United Nations Security Council, the Secretary-General drew up his "Agenda for Peace". In this important document Mr. Boutros-Ghali presented us with his views on how to confront the challenges of our time. The Secretary-General has proposed an evolutionary shift towards peace-keeping, a concept not even mentioned in the United Nations Charter. The sheer size of peace-keeping operations is now staggering in terms of the human and financial resources involved. The nature of peace-keeping has changed as well, as it is no longer based merely on interposing United Nations forces between the warring parties after a cease-fire agreement has been obtained. Troops used to be lightly armed, for purposes of self-defence only. Today, peace-keeping implies military as well as non-military measures, involving for example cease-fire units, civilian police, electoral monitoring units and humanitarian relief.

The Netherlands Government supports this second-generation peace-keeping, including post-conflict peace-building. The Secretary-General of the United Nations recently indicated, and I agree with him, the possibility of even more far-reaching operations regarding what, as I mentioned, he calls "the failed State". In such cases, and I quote the Secretary-General: "It will require long, complex and costly missions which, by their very nature, involve the United Nations in the internal affairs of the country concerned". I would add that this may imply military action.

The risks that domestic unrest and regional instability carry for international stability and security increasingly require our attention. Most importantly, we cannot avoid addressing the internal affairs of a State or region, something which only a short while ago was still unacceptable to may States. Of course, the States of the region concerned retain a special responsibility - one could describe it as a challenge, for that matter. They must take the initiative.

Setting up new cooperative regional structures will in many cases be a long and drawn-out process, which will require sustained effort and support from the international community. To do so effectively, the economic, social, ethnic and humanitarian issues involved will have to be taken into account. Building these structures will require patience and perseverance, in other words: political stamina. There is no short-cut to political and economic justice, which are essential for peace, stability and the rule of law.

I would add that by advocating a comprehensive approach to security issues and their underlying causes, I am not implying that the operationalization of our efforts must be effected through one and the same body. A full array of readily available, specific instruments exists and we should apply them judiciously. The Conference on Disarmament is one such instrument. Negotiating international

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agreements has been the constitutional task of the CD and its predecessor bodies. As such, it has a proud track record. What further use should be made of the CD?

It would seem that the negotiating process in the CD should, in addition to the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty, focus on codes of conduct, confidence-building measures and regimes of a similar nature. The CD may be guided in that respect by the Security Council's assessment that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. For its part, the General Assembly has set out important objectives for the arms control and disarmament agenda of the 1990s under the heading "Transparency in armaments". These two examples are an expression of the increasing consensus of opinion within the international community on what constitutes acceptable behaviour among its members. By shaping such normative values, the Security Council and the General Assembly respectively have provided criteria by which the action of all States can be evaluated.

The foregoing may help to conceptualize the way the CD should carry out the important task under its agenda item "Transparency in armaments". Next to non-proliferation with regard to weapons of mass destruction, transparency in armaments has been pushed to the forefront of our concerns. It is through conventional weapons that most suffering comes about. As such, I consider it a priority item. This "transparency" exercise in the CD should eventually make it easier to achieve proper regulation of the conventional arms trade. I take note in this respect of the interesting idea, suggested by Ireland and Poland for instance, which involved the development of an international code of conduct on arms transfers. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an important component of "transparency in armaments". Some 50 States have now submitted data on their imports and exports of conventional arms and have, in most cases, also provided available background information. This is a most promising start indeed, although broader participation in the Register does of course remain essential. I would like to emphasize that the Register exercise should not be seen as directed against one State or the other. Its function is not to harm anyone, but to increase the security of all. The Netherlands will maintain its efforts to carry this important confidence-building initiative further.

The work of the CD under the heading of non-proliferation should, of course, take place with the highly significant 1995 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in mind. The importance of the NPT is obvious. It stands out as the most successful security-related treaty in existence, providing a universal norm for national and international behaviour. The first in a series of four Preparatory Committees for this conference was concluded in New York last month and it was chaired by my compatriot, Mr. Jan Hoekema. Through the discussion of matters of organization and substance, it paved the way for a thorough review of the way the Treaty functions and for a well-founded decision in 1995 on the duration of its extension. The Netherlands firmly believes that the NPT should continue to be in existence indefinitely and unconditionally after 1995. At the same time, we should aim at strengthening various provisions of the Treaty, including the ones on safeguards.

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My Government is of the opinion that treaties concerning weapons of mass destruction and export control regimes are complementary, interlocking parts of one and the same security policy. At the same time, my Government realizes that for a lasting and effective non-proliferation policy untiring efforts should be pursued to remove the political motives behind proliferation tendencies, which unfortunately still prevail in the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula. The argument that access to technology should be guaranteed is sometimes put forward. This is precisely what my Government is trying to do. Export-control regimes should make it easier for a recipient State to acquire whatever it needs for its legitimate development. A State that strictly abides by its international non-proliferation commitments should have no reason to worry about export control regimes.

While on the subject of responsible non-proliferation behaviour, I would like to express the Netherlands' sincere hope that the high-level discussions between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (held yesterday) will lead to a reversal of the DPRK's announced intention to withdraw from the NPT and to a preparedness on its part to comply with the existing obligations under the Treaty.

At the same time, I would like to underscore the importance of the 1992 Lisbon Protocol to the START Treaty, obliging Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States parties in the shortest possible time. I welcome the fact that Belarus has fulfilled its commitment,and I urge the other two States to do likewise. In the same vein, I welcome the ratification of START I by Belarus and Kazakhstan. My Government calls upon Ukraine to ratify START I and allow for its provisions to be implemented, and thereby to pave the way for START II to be ratified and implemented.

My Government welcomes the Vancouver Summit Declaration by the Russian Federation and the United States, which holds out the prospect of further concrete nuclear arms control and disarmament measures and talks on a ban on nuclear testing. My Government looks forward to the early conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests. It would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and complement the nuclear disarmament process, as agreed between the Russian Federation and the United States. Eventually, all the nuclear-weapon States should be involved in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. I hope that negotiations on a nuclear test ban in the CD can begin soon. Extensive work on the seismic component of verification of a nuclear test ban has already been done. While other verification methods will also be required, I am confident that the CD will be able to work out a proper multi-faceted verification regime for a nuclear test ban.

The Netherlands Government has consistently taken an active interest in the issue of prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities. This subject should again be taken up for negotiation in the CD. I regret that this issue has, until now, divided CD members into two camps: those who seek a blanket protection for all installations and those who want nothing at all. I continue to believe that the

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solution to this deadlock lies somewhere in between. I find it bewildering that no progress could be made in this forum, when many of us agree that an armed attack on a nuclear installation could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked. Most CD members also agree on the need to prohibit armed attacks on nuclear installations from which such releases could occur.

By negotiating treaties with global application, the CD has been given an essential role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Its latest achievement, the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention, is by no means its most negligible. The Convention's verification provisions open up a new chapter in arms control. The Netherlands took an active part in negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention and now carries the special responsibility of hosting the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and, in the future, the OPCW itself. We will do our utmost to facilitate the work of the Preparatory Commission and the OPCW.

I have just referred to the innovative verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Of course, verification is always treaty-specific, while each arms control and disarmament agreement is an individual one. Still, I wonder whether the CD, while exploring avenues for codes of conduct, guidelines and regimes of a similar nature, could not examine the principles of verification drawn up by the UNDC. Related studies carried out in the meantime and practical experience gained since should, of course, be taken into account in the course of such an exercise, the results of which might eventually find a practical application in the context of various peace-building efforts around the world.

As I speak today, another exercise is going on in the Palais des Nations. I refer to the work of the Ad hoc Group of Governmental Experts tasked with the identification and examination of potential verification measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The Netherlands recently carried out a bilateral trial inspection of a large vaccine production facility, the outcome of which appears to be quite encouraging. I look forward to the "VEREX" exercise having a positive outcome. Thorough verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention would close another loophole in the broader regime for weapons of mass destruction. It would thus add to the security of us all.

Certain types of conventional weapons cause horrendous suffering. Their use should be prohibited or restricted. The Netherlands is a party to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, the "Cushie Weapons Convention", and its Protocols. Recently attention has once again been drawn to the indiscriminate and excessive harm inflicted by certain conventional weapons, especially upon the civilian population in areas of conflict. I refer in particular to landmines and the use of incendiary devices against civilian targets. Regrettably, too few States have become parties to the

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Convention. I urge all members of the CD and other States to accede to the Convention. It is indeed high time to convene a conference to review the Convention. We hope that the States participating in that review conference will agree on ways and means to strengthen the Convention. The Netherlands stands ready to engage in consultations with all interested States parties and other States.

The radical transformation of the arms control agenda amounts to so many calls on the CD to rise to the challenge of the 1990s. In today's fast-changing world, the future relevance of the CD is commensurate with its ability to move beyond its monumental achievement of last year, the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The CD's role as the sole, autonomous multilateral negotiating forum for global arms control and disarmament is by now well established and must be preserved. The CD must seize the opportunities presented by the new global realities and priorities in the field of international security. This is not the time for splendid isolation. Instead, the CD should admit new members to its deliberations. It should do so before it decides on a new agenda, if only to give those new members the opportunity to be consulted about the subjects which concern them most. I favour a substantial, yet controlled expansion of the CD with roughly 30 States. After its expansion, the new CD should take a fresh look at its agenda, an agenda that must be flexible enough to be adapted regularly, depending on the international situation. I am confident that the CD as a collective body, will know how to translate the new imperatives of our time into its structure, working methods and agenda.

In conclusion, arms control and disarmament measures alone cannot secure the peace. Such measures must be part of a broader strategy for achieving global security, stability, and the rule of law. Undeniably, there is a growing resolve on the part of the world community to act collectively and decisively to construct a better, safer world. A network of mutually reinforcing instruments is already in place, aimed at grappling with the problems that are confronting the post-cold-war world. The Conference on Disarmament is one such instrument. As a global negotiating forum, the Conference has the potential to contribute to cooperative security and stability at lower armaments levels. In order to realize this potential, the Conference must look forward - not backward - and define its agenda for the nineteen-nineties. For its part, the Netherlands will spare no effort to help the Conference on Disarmament meet present and future challenges.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank his excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to me and my country. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Turkey, Mr. Arar.

Mr. ARAR (Turkey): Mr. President, at the outset, I would like to congratulate you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and assure you of the full support of my delegation in accomplishing your duties.

(Mr. Kooijmans, Netherlands)

In the light of the forthcoming Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for which preparations have already begun, in my intervention today I would like to confine myself to the verification issue.

Turkey, as one of the early signatories of the NPT, has always considered it as a crucial multilateral disarmament treaty which, by reducing considerably the risk of nuclear proliferation, has made a significant contribution to international security. My country, many times in the past, called upon both nuclear and non-nuclear States to accede to the Treaty and at present continues to invite those who do not wish any more to abide by its principles to adhere to it.

However, it should be noted that the risks of proliferation of nuclear weapons have reached their peak despite all the attempts to prevent this trend and over 25 years of existence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This unsatisfactory situation, together with the hopes that we all have for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, should compel us to initiate a serious stock-taking exercise of the experience we have had about the NPT regime.

With due respect to its virtues in promoting nuclear non-proliferation, it is now widely recognized that, mainly owing to the prevailing international conditions of the era in which this Treaty was established, the NPT suffers several shortcomings and gaps, especially concerning its monitoring and verification mechanisms. The important developments which took place in the field of arms control and disarmament since the accomplishment of the NPT, in terms of some international conventions containing detailed and intrusive verification measures, such as the Convention on Chemical Weapons, helped us to understand more clearly these deficiencies.

As a result of radical changes in international relations, important reductions in nuclear weapons are no longer out of reach in the East-West negotiations. Nevertheless, proliferation of nuclear weapons in the third world still constitutes a potential threat to international peace. One may argue that, despite the 1960s projections which indicated the emergence of 30 to 40 nuclear-capable countries, under the NPT regime the number of countries suspected of having acquired nuclear capabilities seems to have been confined to around 10. We cannot accept this outcome as a consolation. We consider this as a proof of the fact that, in spite of being parties to the NPT as non-nuclear States, some countries have been able to obtain nuclear-weapons production capabilities and some of them could actually reach the point of possessing them. This we consider as a situation which cannot be allowed to continue if the NPT is to be extended indefinitely. It would be very difficult for countries which fully comply with the Treaty and which are, for the same reason, negatively affected by the attitudes of non-complying countries, to support the NPT's extension as it stands now.

Having said this, let me clarify my Government's position vis-à-vis the Treaty itself. Turkey supports the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation

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Treaty, as we have already stated on numerous occasions within the United Nations bodies and the relevant organs of the political and military alliances to which we are a party. We do not aim at opening the Treaty to re-negotiation. Our purpose is to protect it. However, there is an urgent need for strengthening its verification mechanisms. We believe that something should be done in conjunction with the extension of the NPT or separately in order to highlight the deficiencies of its verification regime, and to demonstrate to the potential violators of the Treaty that their attitude will not be overlooked or tolerated. We do not think that the international community can and must mobilize its military assets every time that a country has to be carried away with its nuclear ambitions.

We are convinced that ways and means should be sought and found for strengthening the verification regime without jeopardizing the existing text of the Treaty. It is our strongly held view that there is a sufficiently high accumulation of technical know-how and experience in today's world in the field of verification of various arms control arrangements. The international community is able to come up with an efficient system of international verification as far as the proliferation of nuclear weapons is concerned. In our view, a possible way to reach a solution for strengthening verification would be to create a separate negotiating process with the aim of having an international verification protocol which would then be attached to the Treaty itself. This protocol may even be open to yearly evaluation. If effective international verification can be brought into being, this, we believe, would further encourage the allocation of nuclear technology to peaceful uses by promoting licit commerce in nuclear material.

We are convinced that our thoughts will be shared by most members as well as by the observers of the Conference, which is not only a negotiating body but also the main think-tank in the field of disarmament. What we are seeking is in fact an initiation of a thinking process on how to strengthen the verification mechanism under the existing Treaty. We also believe that the Conference on Disarmament, especially once it decides to have some fresh blood by opening itself to new members, will constitute the best forum to undertake this task.

The President (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Turkey for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Norberg.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): Mr. President, I should like to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference and to pledge to you the full support of my delegation.

In February this year, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas, addressed the Conference on Disarmament and stated, inter alia, that the Conference must give the highest priority to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive nuclear test ban is an important instrument in preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons

(Mr. Arar, Turkey)

and an essential step towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. As I recalled in an intervention in this forum about two months ago, the General Assembly of the United Nations last fall approved the resolution on a comprehensive test-ban treaty with a larger majority than ever. In that resolution all States are urged to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all nuclear test explosions for all time.

In the same intervention I also reminded the CD that Sweden two years ago presented a draft comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, contained in document CD/1089* of 31 July 1991. I stated that that proposal was still on the table, but that my Government had concluded that, due to the development since the proposal was submitted, some modifications were necessary. My delegation will today at the meeting with the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban present and circulate a revised draft treaty. First the revision contains a prohibition not only of all nuclear weapon test explosion but also of any other nuclear explosion. The reasoning is that Sweden has concluded that a ban should be total and comprehensive, thus including also an outright prohibition of all so-called peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). There are, in the view of the Swedish delegation, several good reasons for such an approach. The most important is that all PNEs imply a problem since experience gained from them might be used in the development of nuclear weapons. A ban on PNEs is thus an important non-proliferation measure. Furthermore, it seems to my delegation that there are increasing doubts as to the possibility of using PNEs for any practical purpose, not least taking into account environmental hazards.

The second main feature in the modified proposal is that the International Atomic Energy Agency would be entrusted with the verification of compliance with the treaty. The reason is that Sweden finds it questionable whether, in the nuclear field, the best and most cost-effective solution really would be to create a new specialized organization for verification. My Government has, after reconsidering this question, come to the conclusion that it would be a better solution to use the competence and experience gained by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Of course, additional resources and additional expertise have to be brought to the organization. Still it is the view of Sweden that using the International Atomic Energy Agency would be a better and more cost-effective solution than establishing a new specialized organization for the purpose of the treaty.

One of the main reasons for achieving a nuclear test ban, namely to halt the nuclear arms race among the present nuclear powers, has possibly become less significant as the world is now in fact experiencing nuclear disarmament. Yet a halt to nuclear tests, and to nuclear explosions in general, remains equally essential for other reasons, first and foremost as a means to halting the risk of nuclear proliferation. This new situation is reflected in the preambular paragraphs of the modified Swedish draft treaty, where besides the importance of further steps towards nuclear disarmament is also stressed the importance to take effective measures against the proliferation of nuclear arms.

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

It is my hope that the revised Swedish draft will serve as a fruitful input in the discussion on a nuclear test ban. This year an ad hoc committee on the issue is working. It is important to use that forum to accelerate the discussions. At present four of the five nuclear Powers are in practice observing a moratorium on nuclear testing. A favourable climate for progress towards a comprehensive test ban should therefore exist. A prolongation of the existing moratoria, as well as declarations of a moratorium by all nuclear-weapon States, would vigorously contribute to maintaining the momentum. Therefore, Sweden appeals to the nuclear-weapon States not to resume testing in order to confirm the present positive trends towards a nuclear test ban.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Han.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, I would like first of all to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for the Conference on Disarmament this month and wish you much success in your work.

The Conference on Disarmament has begun the second part of its session when world peace and security are being threatened by many factors. It is, as ever, an important task for the Conference on Disarmament to rapidly improve its functions and role and take international measures in a responsible manner on the immediate problems as well as long-term problems relating to disarmament. A comprehensive test-ban treaty, realization of nuclear non-proliferation and cessation of large-scale sale of sophisticated weapons become first major steps to achieving the goal for complete abolition of nuclear weapons and drastic cut in armament.

However, it throws new apprehensions and concerns to the international community that temporarily suspended nuclear tests would be resumed and nuclear technologies and/or materials are proliferated from the nuclear-weapon States to other regions in overt or covert forms. The reports that a large quantity of plutonium and nuclear materials have been transferred from the European nuclear-weapon States to the Far East region arouse deep misgivings among the people in this region where the atomic bombs were first used. The Conference on Disarmament, whose primary task is nuclear disarmament, should render a deserved concern to the fact that nuclear materials are concentrated and sales of highly explosive, modern weapons are on rise in the tensioned Far East region. These phenomena will undoubtedly further aggravate the existing tensions and pose a serious menace to the peace and security of this region.

As is shown by the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and the world statistics on arms trade, the nuclear States and the developed countries have the fundamental responsibilities for maintaining world peace and security, and the prospects for disarmament negotiations should be not bright unless those countries take decisive disarmament measures.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea long ago advanced a number of proposals to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and reunify the divided country peacefully and made all its sincere efforts for their effectuation in order to ensure peace and security in the Korean peninsula where the interests of the powers are concentrated. The fabricated nuclear suspicions and the complicated situations created therefrom have put a big obstacle to the above-mentioned efforts of my Government and brought the situation, which had turned into a road of detente, back to the original point of confrontation. This was stated in detail in the intervention of my delegation at the spring session.

This is, after all, a political problem between the United States and my country, and there is no other solution but only negotiation for this problem. Yesterday, the first high-level talk between the United States and my country was held, and I think that solutions could be found through continuous negotiations.

We made a proposal to south Korea to exchange special envoys appointed by the Chief Executives of the north and the south of Korea in order to discuss all-comprising issues for reunification including implementation of the Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and north-south contact is to be held for this purpose.

Those who really desire detente and peace in the Korean peninsula and the Far East will have to welcome and encourage these negotiation efforts.

However, last week, the delegation of Norway made the statement apparently in an attempt to put pressure upon us, only to reveal its ignorance of the essence of this matter and the recent developments.

My Government did never think of withdrawing from the NPT, only to be faithful in carrying out the obligations under this Treaty.

But, the adventurous military manoeuvres conducted under the pretext of nuclear problem and the adoption of IAEA resolution on "special inspection" have threatened the supreme interests of the country and compelled us to withdraw from this Treaty.

It requires to take a just and impartial stand before the clear facts of who are the offenders and victims, what is the cause and the result and who has really threatened peace and security. With regard to the unjust resolution of the United Nations Security Council, admission to or withdrawal from an international treaty belongs to the sovereignty of each country.

Our withdrawal from the NPT was a self-defensive measure taken in the exercise of the right pursuant to the NPT under the extraordinary situation in which the supreme interests of my country were exposed to grave threat. Therefore, it is not a matter to be discussed at the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations has no legality to adopt a "resolution"

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

over our withdrawal from the NPT. It is unreasonable to talk about "reconsideration" or so.

The United Nations Charter has no article which stipulates that signatories to an international treaty should not withdraw from the treaty or that issue should be taken up with withdrawal from the treaty. The "double standard" of conniving at the offender and putting pressure upon the victim can by no means be justified.

Pressure and coercion cannot be a solution to a problem. Pressure can never work.

The statement of the Foreign Minister of Norway, who has defied all these facts, will only serve to spoil the atmosphere for smooth solution of the problem, which is currently being conducted. Negotiations, a practical way for solution of the problem should be supported and encouraged.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

We shall now proceed to consider the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. In conformity with our practice, the timetable has been prepared after consultations with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. As agreed at the presidential consultations held last week, the plenary meeting originally scheduled for Thursday, 10 June, will now be held instead on Tuesday, 8 June, at 10.a.m. so that the Conference may receive His Excellency the President of Argentina, Dr. Carlos Menem. We shall therefore proceed accordingly. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts this timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I would like to inform members, this morning, I learned that the G21 has requested that after this meeting an informal meeting be held for them to discuss document CD/1200, the draft decision put forward by the G21. At the request of the G21, document CD/1200 has been circulated at this meeting. As the President and in accordance with rule 19 of the rules of procedure of the Conference, I suggest that the meeting discuss this request and a decision be made. I am in the hands of the plenary. Now I would like to invite comments from delegations. If there is no objection, we shall so decide.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): Five minutes after the closure of the plenary we shall hold an informal plenary. The plenary has finished its work for today.

May I invite delegations to be available in the conference room next Tuesday not later than 10 a.m. so that we may start the plenary meeting as soon as the President of Argentina arrives. In view of the high level visit on that occasion, may I invite you to wear your identification badges in order to facilitate entrance to the Conference room as well as to the gallery.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 8 June, at 10 a.m. sharp. The plenary stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.